Abstract. The analysis of externalities in technology-
INTRODUCTION
Advances in IT continue to challenge managerial decision-makers in terms of the timing of adoption, the appropriate level of investment, the rationale for further expansion, and the key indicators of business value. We examine IT decision-making under uncertainty for settings that involve positive demand-side and negative congestion network externalities, and where flexibilities in timing, commitment and investments are appropriate as time reveals the extent of the countervailing impacts.
There are many contexts where having such analytic capabilities to support these kinds of decisions will be appropriate. For example, San Francisco, Philadelphia and other cities in the United States have plans to set up free WiMAX Internet connectivity for their citizens a setting in which both positive demand-side externalities and negative congestion-related externalities are likely to occur. The governments of these cities are likely to be faced with the usual questions that pertain to network technology decisions: How much to invest? How quickly to expand? What service levels to provide? What will the passage of time reveal about consumer demand and value? Digital wireless phone technologies present a similar set of managerial issues in a positive and negative externalities setting. The convergence of digital content, including images, music, GPS location information, and television, is rapidly transforming cellular phones into multimedia devices, with increasing complexity in terms of externality-led business value. Another technology with similar issues is radio frequency identification (RFID). This has the potential to radically alter existing business processes, if RFID chip and reader costs can be reduced and technology standards issues are resolved things which have caused uncertainty in the marketplace.
Countervailing externalities have relevance at different levels of analysis. We will report on three levels: the economy or market level, the firm or process level and the individual or product level. The network externalities associated with government decisionmaking related to WiMAX and other public communication and computing infrastructures play out at the market or economy level of analysis. This is an interesting level of analysis in the sense of the well-known epithet the connectivity that is offered create consumer welfare, but there is also the possibility of congestion if the growth trajectory for such services is not wellmanaged, leading to inappropriate distribution of the social welfare benefits or failure. Firm adoption of RFID for supply chain management processes occur at the firm and business process level, creating opportunities for extraordinary changes in procurement, collaborative product development, and other interfirm alliances. The network externalities resulting from the convergence of a large number of services on a mobile telephone network exemplifies another setting in which we expect countervailing externalities to occur at the product or individual level.
Managerial decision making in network technology contexts like these requires increasing sophistication on the part of managers to understand: (1) the interplay between positive and negative network externalities; (2) how they change over time and affect business value; and (3) how to take advantage of methods that treat the analytic structure of settings that require the handling of decision-relevant managerial information over time. How to model the dynamic externality-driven business value related to network value phenomena is especially well informed by new techniques from financial economics on decision-making under uncertainty. They can help to represent uncertainties related to the evolution of countervailing externalities as well as those associated with development costs, future benefits and the flexibility of investment timing. Some of the newest decision support alternatives have come in the form of models that embed real options, and go beyond the limitations of standard option pricing methods (e.g., the Black-Scholes and binomial models) with new approaches [39] .
To date, however, most research that has applied real options methods for investment evaluation and project management related to electronic networks has only done so for much simpler problems involving network externalities, and then, with relatively standard option pricing frameworks only. Benaroch and Kauffman [6, 7] analyze electronic banking network expansion with variants of the Black-Scholes option pricing model, and suggest ways to overcome some of the methodological difficulties. Benaroch [5] and Benaroch et al. [8] , in their exploration of the Internet sales channel, show how multiple options can be analyzed for an investment decision so as to control the risks and enhance the rewards associated with a project. Panayi and Trigeorgis [33] analyze a multi-stage option for a telecommunication provider and international expansion by a bank and highlight similarities which enable the use of this approach for decisions for investment in electronic networks and other IT infrastructure. Grenadier and Weiss [15] also use a real option model for the optimal investment strategy for a firm faced with sequence of technology innovations. Fichman [13] integrates the adoption of an innovative IT project and its valuation with real option analysis. He argues that when uncertainty and irreversibility are high, concepts from real options should be used to structure the evaluation and management of investment opportunities.
Kauffman and Li [25, 26] offer useful ideas on investment evaluation for electronic networks with positive externalities. They consider the investment timing strategy for a firm that is deciding about whether to adopt one or the other of two incompatible and competing technologies in light of expectations associated with future technology competition. They posit that that a technology adopter should defer its investment until one technology's probability to win out in the marketplace and achieve critical mass reaches a critical threshold. The context where the cost of adoption of technology declines with time has been studied by Demirhan et al. [11] . They show that uncertainty on the part of the first investor can lead to cost disadvantages and over-and under-investments.
In We will demonstrate the use of a game-theoretic decision model and the real options analysis for the study of dynamic network externalities and network options. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we provide the theoretical basis for our analysis of countervailing network effects. In §3, we present several illustrative game-theoretic models for technology adoption and decision-making under uncertainty involving externalities at different levels of analysis. We cover each of the levels of analysis that we have already discussed. In §4, consider some extensions to a current approach for decision under uncertainty involving options thinking for the specific purpose of dynamic countervailing externalities analysis. In §5, we discuss some of the implications of this approach and its limitations. In §6, we conclude by highlighting the contributions and limitations.
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
We next discuss the relevant theoretical background as a basis for the analysis of countervailing network externalities.
A Brief Theoretical Perspective
Katz and Shapiro [22, 23] laid the modern foundations for the analysis of network externalities. By characterizing technology adoption in presence of network externalities, they showed that adoption decisions are influenced by installed base in the market, as well as expectations of its future size. Network externalities may lead to market distortions which result in the competitive equilibrium being inefficient. When this occurs, an inferior technology may become inappropriately dominant.
Matutes and Regibeau [31] used a game-theoretic approach to show that network externalities between compatible products can lead to higher prices and greater variety. Firms benefit through compatibility, when standardization is not cost-prohibitive. Such strategies also tend to increase the social surplus but reduce the consumer surplus, and markets with network externalities will show excess inertia by creating barriers for the success of new but incompatible products. Katz and Shapiro [21] argue that under certain conditions this may not be the case, however, and that firms can still succeed by going to market with new but incompatible technologies. Au and Kauffman [3] show, in the context of the adoption of electronic bill payment and presentment (EBPP) technology network externalities, that billers are more likely to adopt existing technology early even when the next technology is superior to the existing one. But if the earlier technology has higher costs, billers will be willing to wait. Kauffman and Li [26] point to the existence of technology traps that occur when firms mistakenly emphasize additional investments in last generation technologies for which they find continuing profits, when better strategies may involve preemptive learning about new technologies and cannibalizing current market share.
Positive and Negative Externalities
Some networks support the creation of both positive and negative externalities in the same operating context. Examples include instant messaging, open source software, peer-to-peer networks, email networks, Wikipedia, and the agglomeration of firms in a geographic area, and so on. Increasing the number of users in these network leads to greater positive externalities, but this also leads to heightened negative externalities from congestion. The tension between these opposing forces influences the . Riggins et al. [34] , for example, examine the impact of network externalities on the growth of interorganizational systems. In a game-theoretic model, they find that suppliers joining a procurement network may experience negative externalities from congestion and competition, which makes it hard for them to be profitable sellers. Meanwhile, buyers who are interested in accessing more suppliers may have to subsidize the [27] empirically showed the role of positive demand-side and negative network competition externalities in adoption decisions in shared electronic banking networks involving automated teller machines. They find that banking markets which are able to support larger e-banking networks sizes and a higher externality levels have banks that tend to adopt sooner in spite of negative externalities that support branch banking inertia.
Asvanund et al. [1] analyze the externalities in peerto-peer (P2P) music sharing networks, for song availability, user queries and song downloading congestion. Dai and Kauffman [9] also model countervailing network externalities which arise in buyer adoption of proprietary and open standard procurement-related systems. They provide a general functional form for the externalities, and argue that this representation can be adapted to suit a range of externalities analysis contexts. This is the externality ratio, f (n, N), where N is the potential maximum number of users on the network and n is the actual number of users on the network at some point in time. The functional form depends on the context and nature of externalities that are modeled. A game-theoretic approach is appropriate for modeling network externalities. A decision maker needs to account for other existing network users, and the likely number of future users on the network, to estimate utility from investment [22] . The externality ratio, f(n, N), enables the network utility of an agent i to be represented in a generic form [37] :
. In this expression, u i is the total utility experienced by agent i, v i is the stand-alone use utility, and the negative or positive externalities are a function of the current and expected network base.
We have argued that different kinds of networks may give rise to positive, negative or both externalities. Apart from their dominant valence (i.e., whether positive or negative externalities tend to dominate value), the impact intensity may also vary across contexts.
APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
We now illustrate this evaluative perspective for several examples at different levels of analysis.
Market Level: Agglomeration of IT Firms
An important aspect of the digital economy is production of IT goods and services. The IT-producing sector is a vehicle for economic growth. DeVol [12] says that among American metropolitan areas, growth in the high-tech industry explains nearly 70% of the variation in relative economic growth. Hanna [18] avers this result for India, and argues that IT is a strategic sector with capabilities to transform a developing country into a modernized global economy.
The spatial distribution of IT firms is marked by agglomerations, such as Silicon Valley in the Bay Area of California, Route 128 in Massachusetts and others in different parts of the world. Agglomerations occur as positive externalities develop within the same industry or across different industries [30, 20] . Marshall [30] identified sharing of inputs, labor pooling and knowledge spillovers as externalities which benefit localized firms. Externalities represent economies of scale, and regional specialization has its advantages. Jacobs [20] , in contrast, argues that externalities come from economies of scope: it pays to have variety and diversity.
Krugman [29] posits that agglomeration is the result of the centripetal forces caused by positive externalities and the centrifugal forces caused by negative externalities. The positive externalities arise from market-size linkages, labor pooling and knowledge spillovers. The negative externalities arise from high land rents, labor, other factors and congestion externalities.
The benefit from externalities in agglomerated firms is uncertain. The extent of externalities varies across different IT industries [24] . Agglomeration externalities can vary due to differences in industrial composition, spatial distribution of firms, and the path dependence of agglomerations [34] . The presence of synergistic industries may be more beneficial for firms of a particular industry. For example, the presence of semiconductor and other electronic components manufacturing industry provides combined scale and scope externalities for the computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing industry in the agglomeration [24] . The spatial distribution is important because ag-glomeration externalities attenuate over distances and the layout of economic activities may influence externalities. A firm on other side of an expressway, for example, is likely to create less externality influence as a firm on the same side. The dynamic nature of these externalities suggests that an economic activity in the past continues to have effect on activities in the present. Also, firms in a concentrated location may create negative externalities as reflected by increase in wages, land rents, etc. A manager needs to account for changes in these positive and negative externalities while making a location choice for firm.
Modeling Framework. Agglomeration results in shifting the production function of firms due to the externalities discussed above. Assuming that this ction of an establishment can be written as (A)f(z), where z represents inputs including land, labor, capital and materials and A represents the effect of agglomeration. Let the agglomeration externalities experienced by firm i from a collocated firm j be represented on the industrial, geographic and temporal dimensions as [36] . Note also, that these externalities may increase or decrease, depending on whether the positive or congestion externalities dominate. Firm i is influenced by n firms in the agglomeration (j=1, ,n), so the environment A of the firm i is given by:
The term L(z i , z j ) reflects the benefits from the scale of inputs used by firms i and j. (A i ) corresponds to the deterministic externality ratio for agglomeration externalities, which permits us to represent firm i tput as:
This model can be used to carry out longitudinal empirical studies to show how the agglomeration externalities change over time [19, 14] . The production and cash flows of the firm depend on the agglomeration externalities. However, the magnitude of these externalities is uncertain. Investment costs and the production function of the firms change over time, senior managers will need to monitor these changes to determine when, if at all, it is optimal to invest in a given a location.
Firm Level: Financial Data and Poaching
We next present an example of positive and negative externalities at the firm level, in the context of information exploitation through interorganizational systems ownership. Han et al. [16] show that ownership structure of financial risk management systems can affect information exploitation and technology adoption. J.P. Morgan, a New York City-based investment bank provided a free risk management service called RiskMetrics in the 1990s to promote value-at-risk assessment by their clients. Risk Metrics provided a measure of portfolio risk, the possible loss of value which a client may suffer for a given portfolio. Despite its usefulness, the service was not adopted by majority of the Mor Morgan later spun it off as a separate entity and subsequently more firms adopted. The authors suggest that when RiskMetrics was owned by J.P. Morgan, its clients feared the inappropriate use of information related to their overall risk situation by the bank. Using a game-theoretic deterministic expected-value model, the authors show that when the service is free, the service provider is likely to poach customer information. The customer will suffer a negative externality from adoption of the service, as a result. Meanwhile, the service provider has the potential to gain the benefits from positive externalities from the exploitation of such information. Actually, the more firms that participate as customers, the more valuable will the risk management-related information that becomes available. For example, when the service provider learns about the in ggregate position, it may increase its lending rate to the client. Customers, thus, face uncertainty with respect to the value that they may derive from joining the service.
Modeling Framework. Han et al. [16] develop a deterministic game-theoretic model for the technology investment decisions of a vendor of a financial risk management system. They examine a bank bor adoption for the system in a setting with positive and negative externalities. Three time periods are included: t=0 corresponds to when the borrower makes adoption decisions; t=1 is when the service provider chooses levels of non-contractible investments; and t=2 is when renegotiation takes place and value is shared. Our modeling notation is in Table 1 . The model assumes that adverse effects of information exploitation on the borrowers are relative to the risk of their portfolio b. Only benefits of quality enhancement effort q( ) are subject to bargaining at t=2 q( ) is greater than the
Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2007
The borrow fits from using the service, which can have potential risks of information exploitation by the service provider are:
{u(e)b j )} after negotiation. These expressions are the externality ratio for the borrowers and service provider.
In this firm-level context, each borrowing firm experiences a negative externality, while the service provider experiences a positive externality with each new borrower joining the network. With time, when the benefits are revealed, the firms are able to renegotiate benefit sharing. Apart from uncertainties associated with the benefits bV for borrowers and u(e) for the service provider, the borrowers would like to see how the uncertain benefits of quality improvement are shared between the borrower and service provider before they make their investment C.
Firm Level: E-Procurement Networks
We next present another example of positive and negative congestion externalities at the firm-level [9] . The context relates to e-procurement with open networks or e-markets, and proprietary closed networks or extranets. E-procurement systems vary in many aspects, including the underlying technologies and specific functions. One feature on which they can be differentiated is the openness of the trading networks they create. For example, Web-based B2B exchanges provide open networks with potentially larger pools of business partners for their member firms, offering more buyers to reach and more orders for suppliers.
Proprietary networks are closed networks: they are only open to pre-selected business partners, who are able to meet special process, quality and financial capabilities requirements. E-markets and extranets differ in the market-making capabilities they offer to participants: e-markets tend to lower the searching for products, new suppliers, etc. The costs associated with e-markets are lower than those for extranets. But, extranets reflect a greater degree of trust and lead to value-generating information sharing. Using a game-theoretic deterministic expected-value countervailing externalities model for single-buyer system with multiple suppliers, Dai and Kauffman [9] find that a buyer will adopt an e-market approach when access to strategic information is modest compared with the marketplace benefits less the channel costs. In addition, the buyer is likely to have a bigger trading network with an e-market than with an extranet in order to capture the greatest available benefits.
Modeling Framework. Assume that the buyer has N suppliers and initiates the implementation of an eprocurement system. The suppliers must decide whethTo participate, a supplier must incur a one-time cost for adoption C, which relates to aggregate investment in the software, hardware and telecommunication network. This investment reflects both fixed and variable costs that a supplier has to incur to set up an electronic -procurement network. At the same time, the supplier will enjoy efficiency benefits for reduced data entry and order processing costs due to electronic communications with the buyer.
The supplier enjoys a competitive advantage by joining the e-procurement network. But such benefits decrease as the number of participating suppliers increases since more suppliers have better access to information. Let K ntage when the first suppler joins the e-procurement system. As the number of suppliers increases, each externality ratio, f(n, N), which is a function of the number of participants, n, and the total number of suppliers in the e-procurement network, N.
Let I represent relationship-specific investment by the supplier on the IOS which benefits the buyer. For example, this may represent a tment in vendor-managed inventory. When a supplier considers whether to join, the net benefits it perceives are:
The superscript Join on the net benefits of the subscripted Supplier represents the case in which the supplier joins the e-procurement network. Similarly, the e-procurement network is:
where the superscript NoJoin indicates that the Supplier does not join the e-procurement network. As the initiator, the buyer makes investments in designing and implementing the e-procurement system. In addition to the upfront costs, the buyer will incur marginal costs as suppliers join the network, including communication linkages and data processing expenses. These costs h are an increasing function of the number of suppliers, n, participating in the network, h(n) = h 0 + h 1 n, with h 0 >0 and h 1 >0.
The buyer will obtain operational efficiency by implementing the e-procurement system and this efficien-
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cy gain increases with the number of suppliers who join in the network from operational efficiency, R, when an additional supplier joins the network, we get the total efficiency benefits for the buyer nR. The buyer also derives marketplace benefits due to e-market use. These benefits, G > 0, increase with the number of suppliers on the procurement network. The net benefit a buyer expects to gain by implementing an e-procurement system is:
with nI+nG representing the positive externality which the buyer experiences from the n suppliers joining the network. The negative externality ratio represented in Eqn. 6 is parameterized as f(n,N) = (N-n)/ (N-1) . So, the first buyer who joins the network enjoys full competitive advantage, but this erodes as more suppliers join the network. When all the suppliers have joined the network, none of them has any competitive advantage over the other. This representation enables exploration of questions like the optimal relationshipspecific investment that a supplier should make in a given system. It also provides insights into when the buyer is likely to adopt open systems versus when the buyer is likely to adopt proprietary systems. The investment C which the supplier has to make for adoption of the e-procurement system depends on the various uncertainties which are resolved over time. 
, and h EMKT < h XNT , the actual nature of these differences only are revealed over time. The positive externalities experienced by the buyer and the negative externalities experienced by the suppliers also are stochastic. Thus, a buyer wants to see how the benefits evolve, depending on the number of buyers who join the e-market or extranet and then take a decision to invest C EMKT or C XNT .
Product Level: Email and Spam Filters
We next consider a fourth setting at the product level spam in electronic mail networks where there also are countervailing positive and negative externalities. The externalities may affect a user s decision to adopt anti-spam software, as well as a developer s decision to develop better versions of the anti-spam software. Software developers have come up with different kinds of anti-spam software, each with differing features. Some simple spam filters block email from all senders who are not identified by the receiver. More sophisticated spam filters provide greater flexibility and filter spam based on other characteristics (e.g., words in message headers or message, images, attachments types).
Modeling Framework. Based on the popular conand negative externalities for email network increase in a quadratic manner. These externalities again can be represented by the general functional form f (n, N). In this model, we assume two types of spam filters. A Type 1 spam filter blocks all unidentified email messages (and users) and quarantines them. A Type 2 spam filter filters emails based on the contents of the email message. Our two-period model assumes that the spam filter developer develops the Type 1 spam filter in Period 1 and the Type 2 spam filter in Period 2. Using an deterministic expected-value game-theoretic model, we explore resulting investment strategies for a spam developer. Table 2 presents the notation for this case. Let 1 be the valuation parameter of the marginal user who buys the Type 1 spam filter in Period 1 and 2 be the valuation of the marginal user who switches to the Type 2 spam filter in Period 2. Also assume that there is no overlap of sales, so the developer does not sell the Type 1 spam filter in Period 2. This is reasonable. In the software industry, developers often stop selling or gradually phase out earlier versions once a new version is launched. Another assumption is that the monopolist can pre-commit to prices p 1 and p 2 at the beginning, and that users make decisions based on these stated prices. We normalize the marginal cost of producing the Type 1 and Type 2 spam filters to zero.
Based
Since the valuation of the users is uniformly distributed, the marginal user, who is indifferent between using the Type 1 spam filter in each period and not using it in either period, is obtained from:
( 
The cost for development of the Type 2 spam filter is related to the stringency of its filtering mechanism. Thus, its cost is , such that for lower values of , the cost of development would be higher. The twoperiod profit of the spam filter developer is:
The developer can select , 1 and 2 which will maximize his profit, as represented in one of the objective functions for this model. The total two-period valuation for all email users is given by Eqn. 17 below: (17) The externalities, both positive and negative, which arise affect the development cost of the spam filter and cash flows which the developer can expect. The externalities evolve over time and although in the modeling example we assume deterministic expected values, in real life situation, these values may vary stochastically due to various factors. For example, by waiting, the developer is able to get a better idea of 1 and decide based on how the externalities evolve.
A REAL OPTION EXTENSION
The crux of managerial decision-making in the countervailing externalities cases we have mentioned is the extent to which the revelation of uncertaintydiminishing information over time is likely to affect the various timing, adoption and investment decisions that are made. We next extend our decision model to incorporate real option thinking, to treat uncertainty. This approach adds richness to the analysis and increases the theoretical and managerial interest.
We have illustrated through four different examples that in business settings with countervailing externalities, the dynamic evolution of externalities poses challenges which deterministic expected-value gametheoretic models cannot fully address. The examples at three different levels of analysis (market, firm and product) show that the analytical challenges are common across the levels. The managers face this challenge in different contexts with the only common underlying feature being the existence of countervailing externalities. A manager in a firm wanting to decide on location may not know whether scale, scope or combined scale-and-scope externalities will exist in the location of choice. A firm vulnerable to information exploitation will not know to what extent it can share the value of quality improvements with the service provider. A software developer does not know to what extent the positive and negative externalities will influence adoption of new product.
In each of these situations, the evolution of externalities over time is stochastic and uncertain. Also relevant is that costs may change in some cases, along with externalities. For example, the land rents and wages may go up as more firms locate in a city, altering investment costs. The service provider may hike the fees of the service for clients, as more customers join a network, or buyers subsidize suppliers to join an eprocurement network to incent other suppliers to join. Thus, both the benefits and the costs will stochastically change as the real values of network externalities unfold. As we know from our other work [6, 7, 9, 10, 25, 26] , real options are often embedded in settings which involve network and congestion growth. It is hard to make an exact prediction of the extent to which externalities positive or negative will actually result in a given context. When both positive and negative exter- Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2007 nalities coexist, the variance of expected value of the externalities will be the sum of the variance of each. Therefore, the variance will be greater, so that the uncertainty and risk involved in investment will be higher too.
Most deterministic game-theoretic models consider only an expected value of these externalities to inform managerial decision making, which makes them a weaker tool for this kind of analysis. But the real options approach provides a method which empowers managerial decision-making by providing evidence on whether to wait and decide, as well as the optimum time to commit to an investment in uncertain dynamic situations.
Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza [38] provide a methodology for such decisions, in which the investment costs and the benefits change stochastically, similar to exercising an American option before maturity. The investments in the examples we have discussed, whether they relate to the location of a firm in an agglomeration, or to making an investment to adopt risk measurement software or e-procurement software or even to develop new software involve stochastic changes in costs and benefits due to the evolution of countervailing externalities. A manager needs to decide on time t for investment, t T, where T represents the end of time horizon after which the option to make the investment does not exist. Note that in each of our contexts, once a decision is made, it cannot be easily reversed. Each of these examples can be considered as an IT acquisition model, as described by Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza [38] . One assumption is required for this: that the investment time is small compared to the period for which the benefits will accrue. This is realistic for the examples relating to agglomeration of IT firms, financial data and poaching, and adoption of e-procurement networks, but perhaps a little less so for the spam filter product. In that example, spam filter development can also be considered as an IT development model, because the idea is to show a proof-of-concept. So here again we use the IT acquisition model.
We next develop general stochastic equations for investment and benefit uncertainty for the examples discussed in Section 3, although we apply them to the agglomeration of firms for the purpose of illustration.
Assuming cost of investment C a firm to locate in a selected agglomeration, the investment uncertainty is:
The first term is the drift in cost. Cost variations may arise due to increase in land rents, increase in wages or scarcity of other inputs. dW represents an increment to the Gauss-Weiner process to represent the stochastic evolution of costs. When negative externalities dominate, will be negative. We model changing costs as proportional to the investment cost, so firms with higher costs will have greater changes in their costs.
Assuming the benefits of the firm can be represented by a production process, the benefits uncertainty equation can be represented as:
The first term again represents the drift and the second term stochastic changes, with dx representing an increment to the Gauss-Weiner process. The benefits change due to evolution of countervailing externalities as described earlier. If the firm decides to invest at time t, then it will receive benefits for the period t to T. The expected present value of the stream of future benefits in (t, T) under risk-neutral measure is:
Here Κ * is the risk premium-adjusted value of Κ . Assuming that F(Y,C,t) is the value of investment C made by the firm at time t, then the solution of the Bellman equation for optimality requires that:
This implies that the value of the investment opportunity is always non-negative and exceeds or is equal to the discounted value or cost of the project [38] . Based on above, the manager has following choices before the firm. If NPV(Y,C,t) < 0, it should wait ,and if waiting is not possible, than abandon and not invest.
An intuitive explanation of the different scenarios described above is as follows. We have shown that F(Y,C,t) is always non-negative. But the idea is to invest when this value reaches its maximum. Since both the costs and benefits are uncertain, it would be best to wait for as long as it permits value enhancement. This suggests waiting as long as F(Y,C,t) > NPV(Y,C,t). If waiting is not possible, one should invest, provided the returns at that time are positive.
The approach we have outlined can inform decisionmakers as countervailing externalities shift over time.
DISCUSSION
The effect of countervailing externalities appears across different contexts and at different levels of analysis. In the deterministic game-theoretic approach we have discussed, these effects can be represented by a general functional representation f(n, N), where n is the number of actual users or members of a network, while N accounts for consumer expectations about the equilibrium size of the network. This generalized form can represent different forms of externalities, including positive and negative, direct and indirect. The exact functional form, however, will vary context to context. Deterministic models only account for the expected value of the externalities though a complete picture for a managerial decision-maker. In real-life contexts, externalities evolve over time. For example, adoption of new technology, as described by diffusion of innovation theory [35] , posits that diffusion takes place over time. So externalities which arise from such adoption are also likely to evolve over time. Adoption and the externalities from such adoption have uncertainty associated with them. It is not possible to predict the externalities. Externalities are still largely a black-box [27] . Consider an example of how different the estimates of externalities may be. Metcalfe Law asserts that the value of an electronic network increases in a quadratic fashion. This has been the belief for over two decades. Odylzko and Tilly [32] recently refuted quadratic growth of network value and claim that it is more accurately represented by n(log(n)). The uncertainty associated with externalities is further enhanced when countervailing negative externalities exist in the same context, which seems to occur quite often.
The real options approach for making investment decisions under uncertainty provides a method for improving decision-making in the context of changing countervailing externalities. It enables managers to wait and take into account the information revealed through the waiting period and then invest at the time when the value of investment opportunity reaches its maximum. It also informs situations when the manager may choose not to invest.
Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza [38] remind us that if both costs and benefits are uncertain, it is better to wait than to investment right away. This is especially true in contexts where the costs of investment may decrease over time (for example, buying new software). However, in other contexts, the costs of investment, though uncertain initially, are likely to have an increasing trend (for example, locating a firm in an agglomeration). In such situations, in spite of uncertain costs and benefits, waiting may result in losses due to higher costs and waiting may not be the best strategy.
Ownership issues can also influence investment decisions and consequently effect externalities in ways which we have not accounted for in our analysis. Bakos and Nault [4] posit that in a network with positive marginal externalities, the benefits of a participant to a network are higher for larger coalitions and for coalitions with a larger stock of assets. However, as we have noted in our e-procurement example, the marginal network externalities fall for larger coalitions. This prompts additional consideration of settings in marginal network externalities vary with coalition size or the scale of the joint assets. Also, in interorganizational systems that have non-verifiable outcomes, as Han et al. [17] discuss, inability to capture incremental payoffs in ex post bargaining are likely to leads to sub-optimal levels of ex ante investments [4] . The payoffs may depend on factors that incomplete contract theory characterizes, including the idiosyncracy, complementarity and essentiality of assets, as well as the indispensability and mutual importance of the partners constituting the network. A real options model for such contexts needs to incorporate features of incomplete contracts for network settings.
CONCLUSION
Our modeling perspective enriches managerial decision-making methods with game-theoretic models for network-related investments in the presence of countervailing network externalities. We have tried to demonstrate this through our analysis. We have shown four different contexts involving countervailing externalities, and applied a general approach that also incorporates real options thinking. The relevance of the approach arises because network externalities change over time and there is uncertainty of the benefits and costs during their evolution.
We offer some new thinking for modeling countervailing network externalities that draws on game theory and real option thinking. Our approach can be further enriched by incorporating other dynamic models, such as asset value diffusion models [25, 26] , network subsidy decision-making models [34] , technology product launch-timing models [28] , and rational expectations decision-making models [2] just to name a few.
